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Abstract 
This research examines whether CEO origin gives impact on earnings 
management through real activities manipulation. The sample of this study is 583 
observations during 2007-2014. This research uses purposive sampling to collect 
data from Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research is conducted by using annual 
reports of manufacturing companies listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
Independent variable is CEO origin (outside and inside) and dependent variable is 
earnings management. CEO origin is measured by using dummy variable. 
Earnings management through real activities manipulation is measured by using 
abnormal cash flow from operation and abnormal discretionary expenses. To 
analysis data, this research uses multiple regression model. The results of this 
research show that CEO origin does not give impact on earnings management 
through real activities manipulation. It indicates that new outside CEO will not 
have positive impact on income-increasing manipulation. 
Keywords: CEO origin, earnings management, real activities manipulation, return 
on assets.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The accounting information about the company’s performance is really 
crucial for the investors in the capital market to make a decision. One of the 
sources is financial report. Financial report is the form of management’s 
responsibility in managing the economic resources trusted to them. 
According to SFAC no. 8 (2010), the objective of general purpose 
financial reporting is to provide financial information about the reporting 
entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other 
creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity. Those 
decisions involve buying, selling, holding equity and debt, and providing 
loans and other forms of credit. The information provided in financial 
reporting is important to help the users of financial report assess the prospects 
for future net cash inflows to an entity, identify the reporting entity’s financial 
strengths and weaknesses, and understand the return that the entity has 
produced on its economic resources. In order to do that, the users need 
information about the resources of the entity, claims against the entity, and 
how efficiently and effectively the entity’s management and governing board 
have discharged their responsibilities to use the entity’s resources. 
Profit is one of the benchmark used by the users of financial report in 
appraising the company’s performance. SFAC no. 1 (1978) stated that the 
primary focus of financial reporting is information about an enterprise’s 
performance provided by measures of earnings and its components. Financial 
reports are made by the management of the company. 
Managers are employed to run the company on behalf of the owner. They 
have responsibility to give information about the underlying condition of the 
company to the owner. Both managers and shareholders have different 
information. Shareholders as principals give the controls and management of 
the company to the managers. As the runner of the company, the managers 
will have more knowledge about internal information and the prospect of the 
company rather than the shareholders. 
Sometimes the information received by the users is not the real underlying 
condition of the company. It makes the users such as investors and creditors 
do mistake in making the decisions. The owner’s objective is not always in 
accordance with the objective of the manager. This situation can lead to a 
problem that is commonly called as conflict of interests. The managers can act 
only based on their interest that will lead them to take some private gain and 
ignore the interest of the shareholders.  
Managers are competing in the labor market because they are the agent. 
Managers with good reputation will have opportunities to get better job and 
vice versa. Their reputation is related with their performance in running the 
company. If the top management or the CEO position of the company can do 
their job well, so the company can achieve its main goal. It is important for the 
CEOs to get achievement every year and fulfill the objective of both the 
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owner of the company (principal) and the CEOs (agent). The owner of the 
company can fire the managers if the company under their direction has bad 
performance. 
CEO turnover is a common phenomenon. According to Anderson and 
Lilja (2013), even if companies put a lot of effort in the choice of CEO, the 
CEOs turnover increased every decade since 1970 with a more significant 
change after 1992. Kaplan and Minton (2008) stated that structural changes, 
emergence, cost saving programs, reorganizations, and increasing demand for 
short term tenures are some explanations for increasing tenure. 
There are at least two factors that can drive the CEO turnover event. First, 
the tenure of the old CEO is up and the company needs to change the position 
with the new CEO. This is a normal condition from the CEO turnover event. 
This condition is often called as CEO turnover routine. CEO turnover routine 
is a planned process that is known by both the old CEO and the new CEO. 
Second, the old CEO cannot run the company well and the company 
cannot achieve its main goal. CEO turnover is a good strategy for a company 
that has a bad condition. This CEO turnover is expected to give better 
prospect. This condition is often called as CEO turnover non-routine. CEO 
turnover non-routine is an unplanned process and the company has a limited 
time to choose the new CEO who will replace the position of the old CEO 
(Wells, 2002). But the company is said to be unstable if the company too often 
experienced CEO turnover every year. 
Turnover in the CEO position is a frequent phenomenon. Nowadays, new 
CEOs increasingly come from outside the company rather than through 
internal promotions. The choice of an external hire is not an exogenous shock, 
but rather is endogenous to CEO and firm characteristics (Kuang et al., 2014), 
which also could drive firm’s earnings management.  
Like other countries, in Indonesia, turnover in CEO position is often 
happen. The turnover of the CEOs can give impact to earnings management 
because it involves decisions by both the departing and incoming CEOs (Choi 
et al., 2012). Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to 
either mislead some stakeholders about the company’s economic performance 
or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Earnings management can be done either 
through accrual manipulation or real activities manipulation. Real activities 
manipulation is earnings management done by the managers which deviate 
from normal business practices aimed of achieving certain earnings 
(Roychodhury, 2006). Usually manager is more likely to use real activities 
manipulation rather than accrual manipulation. There are two reasons behind 
this condition. First, accrual manipulation more often becomes the center of 
observation or inspection by the auditors and the regulators. Second, focus 
attention only on accrual manipulation is a risky action because the company 
may have limited flexibility to manage accrual (Graham et al., 2005). 
In Indonesia, many studies about earnings management have been done. 
Researches on earnings management that have been done in Indonesia mostly 
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investigated the relationship between earnings management and the investors 
reaction in the stock market. Studies that examine whether new CEOs in 
Indonesian companies practice earnings management have not been done so 
much, those studies are still in a few amounts. Most of prior studies about 
earnings management in Indonesia are concern about the practice of earnings 
management from market performance perspective. 
The example of CEO turnover event in Indonesia is the CEO turnover in 
PT Indosat Tbk. The shareholders of PT Indosat Tbk agreed to change the 
composition of directors and commissioners in the general meeting of 
extraordinary shareholders. For the position of President and CEO which 
formerly held by Harry Sasangko Tirtotjondro replaced by Alexander Rusli. 
This change became effective on November 1, 2012. 
Rusli had previously been an Independent Commissioner at Indosat since 
January 2010. Currently he is a member of the Remuneration Committee and 
the Audit Committee of Indosat. In the board of commissioner positions, 
Rudiantara will enter as Independent Commissioner of Indosat from 1 
November 2012. Rudiantara is not a new people in the telecommunications 
industry because he has ever been in the top position in Telkomsel and XL. 
This research is different from prior researches about earnings 
management because this research will examine the behavior of earnings 
management at the turnover of the CEOs in Indonesia. This research will 
examine the turnover of the CEOs based on the origin of the CEO. CEO origin 
is the origin of CEO whether they are promoted from within the company or 
externally recruited. CEO origin is an important factor for explaining financial 
reporting strategies (Kuang et al., 2014). Most of the researches about CEO 
turnover only differentiate between routine and non-routine departures. The 
researches did not separate whether the incoming is through internal 
promotion or external recruitment. 
There are some motivations for the CEOs in doing earnings management. 
Those motivations are stock market motivation, signaling or concealing 
private information, political costs motivation, CEO turnover, bonus plan 
motivation, debt covenant motivation, and regulatory motivation (Rahman et 
al., 2013). This research will examine the earnings management done by the 
CEOs with CEO turnover as the motivation. 
There are four patterns of earnings management: taking a bath, income 
minimization, income minimization, and income smoothing (Scott, 2006). 
This research will examine the earnings management done by the CEOs with 
income maximization as the pattern of earnings management through real 
activity manipulation. 
Based on Kuang et al. (2014) research, they find that compared with CEOs 
promoted from within the company, CEOs recruited from outside have a 
stronger incentive to demonstrate their abilities in the initial years after their 
appointment. They also have lower survival expectations. They predict and 
find that outside CEOs engage in greater income-increasing manipulation after 
their appointment. 
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This research is expected to give the same results as in Kuang et al. (2014) 
research. This study will give empirical evidence that will support the 
previous research. 
 
Research Problem 
This research wants to find whether there is an impact on earnings 
management from the origin of the CEO. CEO origin is the origin of CEO 
whether they are promoted from within the company or externally recruited. 
As a result, there is a research problem that arises from this study: 
a. Does CEO origin give impact on earnings management through real 
activities manipulation? 
 
Research Objective 
This research will give empirical evidence that:  
a. CEO origin gives impact on earnings management through real 
activities manipulation. 
 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Hypothesis Development 
Outside CEOs’ capabilities are not known by the market and the board of 
the company. They want to prove their ability that they can run the company 
well. They also want to establish a good reputation about themselves. They 
have a desire to prove that the company under their direction can achieve its 
main objective. They are worry about dismissal due to unsatisfactory 
performance, and therefore report earnings more aggressively than inside 
CEOs who already have established their ability and more concerned with 
preserving their reputations (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
In addition to their stronger desire to prove their ability, outside CEOs 
tend to have lower survival expectations than inside CEOs. Prior study 
indicates that outside CEOs tend to remain in office for shorter times than 
their inside peers. Hostility from existing senior managers and the outside 
CEO’s own lack of firm-specific knowledge may work against an outside 
CEO’s efforts to initiate strategic changes to achieve initial objectives. A 
corporate board also could have overestimated the outsider’s abilities during 
the CEO selection process because it lacked sufficient information about the 
abilities of the external candidates (Kuang et al., 2014). 
Outside CEOs have lower expectation to stay with the firm for the long 
term. Because they have lower expectation, they tend to act in ways that 
benefit them immediately. They tend to have short-term decision making 
that makes them more willing to increase the earnings management 
immediately after their appointment. They do not consider about the adverse 
consequences of their actions for the future. They are less likely to bear the 
long-term consequences of their actions because they will have already left 
the firm for their next appointment (Kuang et al., 2014). 
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Based on the argument—confronted with outside CEOs’ desire to prove 
their ability and their lower survival expectations--this study can formulate 
the hypothesis as follow: 
H1 : New outside CEOs will have positive impact on income-increasing 
manipulation. 
 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample 
The samples that will be used in this research include manufacturing firms 
listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2007 until 2014. This 
research wants to use longer period of time in order to get more accurate data. 
The data is taken from Kantor Bursa Efek Indonesia at Mangkubumi Street 
111, Yogyakarta and Indonesian Stock Exchange website (www.idx.co.id).  
The available data is from the year of 2007 until 2014. 
This research will use secondary archival data. The data obtained is in the 
form of annual reports that have been audited from 2007 until 2014. The data 
include financial statement and composition board of director. 
The samples in this research are conducted by means of purposive 
sampling. Based on the criteria used as consideration to decide the sample in 
this research, the sample selection process as follows: 
 
No Explanation Total 
1 The number of manufacturing companies listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2007-2014 
125 
2 The number of manufacturing companies whose 
annual reports were not available during 2007-2014 
20 
3 The number of manufacturing companies  that did 
not use Indonesian currency (Rp) on their annual 
reports 
20 
4 The number of manufacturing companies  that did 
not have infomation about president directors 
0 
 Total data for this research 85 x 8 680 
 
Variables 
There are three variables in this research. The three variables are 
independent variable, dependent variable, and control variables. The 
independent variable is CEO origin. The dependent variable is earnings 
management through real activities manipulation. The control variables are 
firm size, leverage, and return on assets (ROA). 
 
Independent Variable 
Independent variable is variable that is not affected by other variable. The 
independent variable in this research is CEO origin. This research defines an 
outside CEO as one who has been with the firm for one year or less before 
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being appointed (Huson et al., 2004; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007). An inside 
CEO is one who has been with the firm for more than one year before being 
promoted. 
This research will use dummy variable OUT to measure the independent 
variable, which is CEO origin. OUT equals to 1 if the new CEO is an outside 
CEO. OUT equals to 0 if the new CEO is an inside CEO. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Dependent variable is variable that is affected by other variable. The 
dependent variable in this research is earnings management. This research will 
use real activities manipulation in measuring the earnings management. 
There are three measurements of real earnings management: abnormal 
cash flows, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary 
expenditures. This research defines real earnings management as the negative 
of the sum of abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary expenditures, so 
that a higher value suggests more upward earnings management (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010). This study does not include abnormal production costs in the 
measurement of real earnings management for the main tests because, as stated 
in Cohen and Zarowin (2010), the same activities that lead to abnormally high 
production costs also lead to abnormally low CFO; thus, adding abnormal 
production costs leads to double counting. 
Managers try to temporarily increase sales during the year by offering 
price discounts. This action is intended to generate additional sales from the 
next fiscal year into the current year. As a result, the total earnings in the 
current period are higher due to the positive margins. But, when the company 
re-establish the old prices, the increased sales volumes as a result of the 
discounts will disappear. The decreasing sales cause the cash inflow per sale 
becomes lower as margins decline. The lower margins due to price discounts 
cause production cost relative to sales to be abnormally high (Roychowdhury, 
2006). 
Managers try to manage earnings upward by producing more goods than 
necessary (overproduction). Because of this higher production levels, fixed 
overhead costs are spread over a large number of units, lowering fixed costs 
per unit. This reduction of fixed costs per unit lead to the declining of total cost 
per unit if there is no any increasing in marginal cost per unit. This implies that 
reported COGS is lower and the company reports better operating margins. 
Nevertheless, the company incurs production and holding costs on the over-
produced items that are not sold in the same period. As a result, cash flow from 
operations are lower than normal given sales levels. The incremental marginal 
costs incurred in the overproduction result in higher annual production costs 
relative to sales (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
So, it can be concluded that price discounts and overproduction lead to 
abnormally high production costs and abnormally low CFO. 
+     (1)     
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+
                                                                                      (2)                                                                    
 +                           (3) 
Where:  
 CFO = cash flow from operations as reported on the statement of cash 
flows 
 PROD = production costs, defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and 
change in inventory 
 Assets = total assets 
 Sales = total revenues 
 DISX = discretionary expenditures, defined as the sum of advertising 
expenses, R&D expenses, selling, general and administrative expenses 
(SG&A) minus salaries. 
SG&A is a composite of several different types of costs. One of the cost is 
salaries. Salary is regulated in the Indonesian Regulation, so it is important 
to remove this cost from SG&A. 
The abnormal cash flows (ACFO), abnormal production costs (APROD), 
and abnormal discretionary expenditures (ADISX) are computed as the 
difference between the actual values and the normal levels predicted (i.e., they 
are the residuals) from Regressions (1) until (3). Abnormal cash flows and 
abnormal discretionary expenditures are multiplied by -1, so that a higher value 
in all cases indicates greater upward earnings management. This study defines 
real earnings management as the sum of ACFO and ADISX. 
 
Control Variable 
Control variable is used to control the influence of independent variable on 
dependent variable and reduce the level of error or confounding variables. The 
control variables in this study are firm size, leverage, and return on assets 
(ROA). 
Firm Size 
The amount of assets owned by the company can be the indicator of firm size.  
The greater the company’s total assets, the greater the size of company. There 
is a negative relation between firm size and earnings management. The bigger 
the firm is, the less earnings management is used (Andersson and Lilja, 2013). 
Bigger firms have more advanced and sophisticated internal control system. 
They also have more qualified internal auditors. Larger companies usually 
have auditors from bigger accounting firms who tend to be more experienced 
and can prevent earnings manipulations. This condition can limit the ability to 
do earnings management. Sánchez-Ballesta et al. (2007) in Anderson and Lilja 
(2013) found that smaller firms tend to report more discretionary current 
accruals. Those smaller firms seem to operate with less scrutiny and therefore 
may engage in more earnings management than bigger firms.  
FS = In (Total Assets) 
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Leverage 
Leverage ratio is used to identify financial risk of a company and combination 
of capital used by the company. Greater leverage indicates the debt of the 
company is higher than the owned asset of the company. High financial 
leverage also related with the future of the firms. The firms need to have 
sufficient fund to pay off their debt and finance their business. According to 
Scott (2006), company that has a lot of leverage will do earnings management 
by raising profits, because the rise reported earnings will reduce the possibility 
of failure to pay its debts in the future.  
  
 
Return on Assets 
Return on Assets (ROA) is an indicator of how profitable a company is relative 
to its total assets. It explains how efficient management is in using its assets to 
generate earnings. The higher the return, the more efficient management is in 
utilizing its asset base. ROA is displayed as a percentage. ROA for public 
companies can vary substantially and will be highly dependent on the industry. 
Companies that require large initial investment will generally have lower ROA. 
ROA over 5% are generally considered good.  
  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
To test the hypothesis, this research will use the following multiple linear 
regression model: 
 
EM = β0 + β1 OUT + β2 FS + β3 LEVERAGE + β4 ROA + ԑ  
 
Where: 
 OUT = an indicator equal to 1 if the CEO is an outside CEO, and 0 if 
the CEO is an inside CEO. 
 FS = firm size. 
 LEVERAGE = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of 
the year. 
 ROA = return on assets of the firm during the year 
 ԑ  = an error term 
 
For the hypothesis test, this research will use multiple linear regression 
analysis to get the information about the relationship between independent 
variable and dependent variable. This research will use t-test to examine the 
significant level of each independent variable to dependent variable. The level 
of confidence is 95%. If the significance t < 0.05 and β > 0, hypothesis is 
accepted. If the significance t > 0.05, hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Data Analysis Methods 
Normality Test 
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Normality test aims to test whether the data in this research is 
normally distributed or not. The decision that can be made based on one 
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with significance level ( ) = 0.05 in 
confidence level of 95% is: 
1. If Asymp. Sig. Value > 0.05, then the data is said to be normally 
distributed. 
2. If Asymp. Sig. Value < 0.05, then the data is said to be not 
normally distributed. 
Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity test aims to test whether there is a correlation 
between independent variables in the regression model. Multicollinearity can 
be seen from the value of tolerance or variance inflation factor (VIF), the 
criteria is: 
1. If VIF value > 10 or tolerance value < 0.10, then there is a 
multicollinearity between independent variables. 
2. If VIF value < 10 or tolerance value > 0.10, then there is no 
multicollinearity between independent variables. 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
Heteroscedasticity test aims to test whether the regression model 
residual variance inequality occurred from one observation to the other 
observation. Glejser test is used to detect heteroscedasticity.  There is 
significance column (Sig.) in the Glejser test. If the numbers above 0.05 
significance mean residual values do not correlate significantly with 
independent variables. 
Autocorrelation Test 
Autocorrelation test aims to test whether there is a correlation between 
observation errors in one period to the other period in the regression model. 
Detection of the autocorrelation is done by using Durbin Watson (DW) test.  
1. DW < dL    There is a positive autocorrelation 
2. dU < DW < 4-dU   There is no autocorrelation 
3. DW > 4dL    There is a negative autocorrelation 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Normality Test 
 Preliminary data of this research is 680, after trimming is done, the final 
data of this research is 583 (97 data is eliminated). Asym. Sig. Value is 0.058, 
where 0.058 > 0.05, it means that the research data is normally distributed. 
 
Multicollinearity Test 
 VIF value of CEO origin (OUT), Firm Size (FS), Leverage 
(LEVERAGE), and Return on Assets (ROA) is less than 10 (1.002<10; 
1.087<10; 1.111<10; 1.196<10) and tolerance value of OUT, FS, LEVERAGE, 
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and ROA is more than 0.1 (0.998>0.01; 0.920>0.1; 0.900>0.1; 0.836>0.1). In 
conclusion, there is no multicollinearity between independent variables. 
 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
Significant value (Sig.) of CEO origin (OUT), Firm Size (FS), Leverage 
(LEVERAGE), and Return on Assets (ROA) is more than 0.05 (0.674>0.05; 
0.199>0.05; 0.191>0.05; 0.668>0.05). In conclusion, there is no 
heteroscedasticity in this research. 
 
Autocorrelation Test 
DW value is 2.008 which is to be among Du 1.810 and 4-du 2.190, where 
1.810 < 2.008 < 2.190. Basic decision making is that if dU < DW < 4-dU, then 
there is no autocorrelation, so it means that this regression model does not 
possess autocorrelation. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
The results of multiple regression analysis are as follows: 
 
 
Model Summ ary
.236a .056 .049 .24417
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), ROA, OUT, FS, LEVERAGEa. 
Coefficientsa
.575 .180 3.192 .001
-.076 .048 -.064 -1.579 .115
-.013 .006 -.085 -2.021 .044
.079 .026 .128 2.993 .003
-.234 .095 -.109 -2.466 .014
(Constant)
OUT
FS
LEVERAGE
ROA
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coef f icients
Beta
Standardized
Coef f icients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: EMa. 
ANOVAb
2.029 4 .507 8.506 .000a
34.460 578 .060
36.489 582
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), ROA, OUT, FS, LEVERAGEa. 
Dependent Variable: EMb. 
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 From the results of the regression analysis on the table above, it can be 
made a model of multiple linear regression equation as follows: 
EM = 0.575 – 0.076OUT – 0.013 FS + 0.079 LEVERAGE – 0.234ROA 
 The independent variable impacts dependent variable if Sig. < 0.05. 
Impact positively when β > 0 and impact negatively when β < 0. The 
independent variable does not impact dependent variable if Sig. > 0.05. 
a. CEO origin (OUT) 
Based on the table above, it can be seen that the significant value 
(Sig.) of OUT is 0.115, where 0.115 > 0.05. It means that CEO origin 
does not impact earnings management. Thus, H1 is not supported. 
b. Firm Size (FS) 
Based on the table above, it can be seen that the significant value 
(Sig.) of FS is 0.044, where 0.044 < 0.05. It means that firm size 
impacts real activities manipulation. The coefficient value (β) of FS is 
-0.013, where -0.013 < 0. It means that firm size impacts real activities 
manipulation negatively. Thus, the bigger the firm size, the lower the 
real activities manipulation. 
c. Leverage (LEVERAGE) 
Based on the table above, it can be seen that the significant value 
(Sig.) of LEVERAGE is 0.003, where 0.003 < 0.05. It means that 
leverage impacts real activities manipulation. The coefficient value (β) 
of LEVERAGE is 0.079, where 0.079 > 0. It means that leverage 
impacts real activities manipulation positively. Thus, the higher the 
leverage, the higher the real activities manipulation. 
d. Return on Asset (ROA) 
 Based on the table above, it can be seen that the significant value 
(Sig.) of ROA is 0.014, where 0.014 < 0.05. It means that return on 
asset impacts real activities manipulation. The coefficient value (β) of 
ROA is -0.234, where -0.234 < 0. It means that return on asset impacts 
real activities manipulation negatively. Thus, the higher the return on 
asset, the lower the real activities manipulation. 
F test 
 F test is used to test whether the regression model fulfill the goodness of 
fit. A regression model is said fulfill the goodness of fit when significant 
value (Sig.) < 0.05. Based on the table above, significant value (Sig.) is 
0.000, where 0.000 < 0.05. It indicates that the regression model meets the 
goodness of fit. 
Coefficient Determination Test 
Based on the test results, it is obtained that Adjusted R Square (Adj. R2) is 
0.049. It means that OUT, FS, LEVERAGE, and ROA can explain REM 
as many as 0.049 or 4,9%, the rest 95.1% is affected by other factors.  
Discussion 
  The result of multiple regression test shows that H1 is not supported. New 
outside CEOs will not have positive impact on income-increasing 
manipulation. Anderson and Lilja (2013) found that the use of income 
manipulation decreased from the year prior CEO change and year after CEO 
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turnover. The test revealed that there is no impact of CEO origin on the 
development of the use of income manipulation from the year prior the 
turnover and the following year. This means that there is no difference 
between internal and external appointed CEOs and the use of income 
manipulation upon arrival even though earnings management occurs between 
years with CEO change in the sense that income manipulation is less used for 
the year of a new CEO. 
  The research result is inconsistent with the previous research. The 
previous research is done in different country. In that country, new CEOs 
increasingly come from outside the companies rather than through internal 
promotions. As stated by Kuang et al. (2014), the choice of an external hire is 
not an exogenous shock, but rather is endogenous to CEO and firm 
characteristics. Every firm in every different country will have different 
characteristics. The firm characteristics in Indonesia are different with the 
characteristics of the firms where the previous study took place. 
In Indonesia, most of the listed companies hire CEO from inside the 
companies rather than outside CEO. Sanjaya (2011b) found that 68.49% 
public companies in the manufacturing industry are controlled or owned by 
family. Companies ownership in Indonesia is dominated by the family who 
becomes the ultimate owner or controlling shareholder. Manager of the 
family company in Indonesia is dominated by family members of controlling 
shareholder. In the phenomenon of the family company, the founders of the 
company continue their ownership in both the top management and the board 
of commissioner position. The comparison amount of outside CEOs and 
inside CEOs are not balance. From 680 data, the total amount of outside CEO 
only 31, while the total amount of inside CEO is 649. 
  La Porta et al. (1999) in Siregar (2007) classified controlling shareholder 
into five: the family, the government, financial institutions with extensive 
holdings, a company with extensive holdings, and the other controlling 
shareholders. Controlling shareholder is an individual, a family, or an 
institution that has control of a company either directly or indirectly on the 
level of certain control rights cutoffs (Claessens et al., 2000b in Siregar, 
2007). Ultimate ownership is a direct and indirect ownership to a public 
company. Based on the concept of ownership, a series of ownership must be 
traced until the ultimate owner can be identified. A public company is 
categorized as a family-controlled company if the company’s largest 
controlling shareholder is an individual at a certain level of control rights. La 
Porta et al. (1999) in Siregar (2007) identified the family based on common 
last name and the relationship of marriage. With a cut-off of 10% of control 
rights, family is the most dominant controlling shareholder. 
  Family company is a company where the founding members of the 
company continue their ownership position in the top management. Family 
company characterized by concentrated ownership of the company's founding 
family and actively involves members of this family in the management of 
the company (Sanjaya, 2014). A family company is often related to high 
family involvement and the long period in management. The company tends 
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to hire its family members rather than hire professional parties. There are two 
perspectives in the family company, the ownership and management. Based 
on the standpoint of ownership, the family controlled company assets. 
Meanwhile, from the standpoint of management, members of the family 
became the company's top management. 
 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Conclusion 
  This research investigates the impact of CEO origin on earnings 
management through real activities manipulation. This research is using 
sample of 85 manufacturing firms listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange during 
period 2007-2014. It concluded that CEO origin does not give impact 
earnings management. As the research result shows, the hypothesis of new 
outside CEOs will have positive impact on income-increasing manipulation is 
not supported. 
 
Research Limitation and Suggestions 
 The limitation of this research is that the observation period of this study 
is only 7 years. It starts from 2007 to 2014. This research is expected to 
provide ideas for future research related to CEO origin as one of the 
motivations for managers in doing earnings manipulation. Related to the 
result that has been documented in this study, there are several opportunities 
for future research. Future research can use non-manufacturing companies as 
sample beside manufacturing companies in order to test the consistency of the 
findings in this research. Future research can also extend the period of the 
research, so that the data will be more accurate. 
 
 
 
 
